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THE POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL:
BENEFITING FROM SENIOR BROKERS
CHARLES GALUNIC
INSEAD
GOKHAN ERTUG
Singapore Management University
MARTIN GARGIULO
INSEAD
The importance of an actor’s network to his/her private benefits is well explored. Less
well understood are the positive externalities of an actor’s social capital—that is,
whether it spills over and improves the outcomes of those to whom he or she is
connected, creating broader, not just private, benefits. This study examines how
investment bankers add value to one another in the course of everyday work. Our
concern is with a banker’s second-order social capital. The main question is whether
being connected to a broker matters to the ability of a focal actor to add value to those
around him/her. We argue and find that the importance of connecting to a broker is
contingent on the broker’s seniority relative to the focal actor. Networks of contacts
who are of higher rank and/or the focal actor’s leader positively contribute to the
ability of the focal actor to add value. Second-order social capital does matter, when
contacts are senior brokers.
Strikingly little research in network studies con-
cerns the positive externalities of social networks.
An externality exists when an activity (e.g., build-
ing and maintaining a social network) affects actors
other than a focal actor without this effect being the
original purpose of that activity. Most research on
social capital has focused on how actors benefit
from their networks. It is well established that ac-
tors’ immediate social networks matter for their
own performance (compensation, promotion),
power, and reputation (Brass & Burkhardt, 1993;
Burt, 1992; Kilduff & Krackhardt, 1994; Krackhardt,
1990). Whether an actor’s social network “adds
value to” other actors, however, remains an under-
explored question (Bowler & Brass, 2006; Settoon &
Mossholder, 2002). This question is reasonable and
important. It is reasonable if one believes that the
value an actor adds to others can be shaped by that
actor’s social structure. The normal assumption un-
derlying social capital approaches to interpersonal
exchange is that cooperative, value-adding ex-
changes naturally occur “along social ties” (be-
tween actors with ties to each other) and so focus
on the consequences of network structures for per-
sonal gains (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Yet the effect
that social structure might have on the quality and
usefulness of such an exchange demands more at-
tention. It is an important question if one takes
seriously the claim that for firms to add value to
clients and customers, they must also ensure that
employees add value to each other.
A positive externalities approach to social capital
would differ from a private benefits perspective in
two ways: the first involves outcomes of social cap-
ital, or what is measured as the consequence of
social capital. Our article shifts attention from a
private goods approach to social capital—focused
on the benefits to focal actors—toward a more pub-
lic goods approach, one concerned with the posi-
tive externalities of an actor’s social capital for
other parties (Leana & Van Buren, 1999). In doing
this, we study something implied by cooperative
exchanges but not necessarily measured by or re-
sulting from them: whether recipients actually find
the exchanges to be helpful and value adding. Add-
ing value to others involves offering one’s time,
expertise, insight, or resources to the benefit of
fellow employees in doing their jobs. As organiza-
tions grow flatter, more team based, and more
knowledge intensive, such circulation of ideas, ex-
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pertise, and support among employees is vital
(Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 1995).
Second, a positive externalities approach should
also concern orders of social capital and embrace
whether the social structure that surrounds an
actor’s contacts—that is, the actor’s second-order
social capital—matters independently of the struc-
ture of that actor’s direct ties. Research on second-
order social capital is scarce and nascent (Brass,
2009, 2012), and studies appear to have inconsis-
tent findings. Burt (2007) found that individual
performance measures are impacted by the struc-
ture of direct (first-order) contacts but not by indi-
rect (second-order) contacts. In research on em-
ployee influence and leader-member exchange,
however, Sparrowe and Liden (1997, 2005) found
that the social structure of a leader’s contacts does
contribute to how much influence an employee of
that leader is perceived to have. Leader centrality
in an advice network positively moderates the im-
pact of leader-member exchange, enhancing per-
ceived member influence. A key implication of
Sparrowe and Liden’s work is that not all “alters”
are alike in how their social networks impact the
performance of a focal actor. Although the social
structure of the “average” alter may not matter to an
actor’s value-added, the social structure of certain
alters—including but not exclusively leaders—may
have substantial impact.
Our study contributes to our understanding of
second-order social capital by exploring and bridg-
ing the vast middle ground between the general
claim that the average alter’s social structure does
not matter but the social structure of a very specific
alter/role (a focal actor’s leader) does. We explore
whether being connected to alters who occupy bro-
ker positions helps the focal actor add value. Brass
(2009) described situations in which connecting to
brokers should be beneficial, while also noting the
inherent risks of connecting to someone whose ad-
vantage is rooted in superior ability to play off
contacts against one another, taking advantage of
“information asymmetries” to dictate the terms of
exchanges. From a practical viewpoint, whether or
not brokers add value to others is important for
organizations, because they typically bestow bigger
rewards on individuals in brokerage positions. If
brokers indeed add more value to others than non-
brokers do, this allocation of rewards would have a
multiplicative effect on an organization’s overall
performance—through incentivizing and encourag-
ing brokers but also through positive spillovers to
others. On the contrary, if brokerage has negative
externalities for a broker’s contacts, the rewards
bestowed on brokers might have a detrimental ef-
fect on the creation of a performance-oriented cul-
ture in an organization. We argue that whether or
not being connected to a broker is beneficial is
contingent on other central features of the broker,
features that should help ensure the focal actor
more fully leverages the broker as an alter. Specif-
ically, we predict that employees will benefit from
being connected to brokers when those brokers oc-
cupy higher positions in the structure of an organ-
ization than the actors themselves occupy. These
are brokers who have higher formal rank than the
focal actor, and they include but are not exclusively
the focal actors’ leaders. We argue that such formal
position in an organization is important for the
materialization of second-order social capital ef-
fects by building on Sparrowe and Liden’s (2005)
work: the benefits of a leader’s network can be seen
as one instance of the general advantage of being
connected to high-ranking brokers. In sum, we con-
tribute a juxtaposition of social structure (brokerage
advantage) and role relations, such as rank and
leadership position, to furthering scholarly under-
standing of positive network externalities.
We study work relationships among 2,200 bank-
ers in a global investment bank. Once a year, em-
ployees are asked to identify colleagues with whom
they have had substantial business interaction dur-
ing that year and to rate the value each added to
their work. This rating exercise captures the pattern
of working relationships among the employees and
provides a reliable measure of the value each of
them added to the work of their colleagues, provid-
ing an excellent opportunity to examine how social
structure—both first- and second-order—influ-
ences the value an actor adds to others. We exam-
ine whether being connected specifically to senior
brokers (brokers ranked higher than a focal actor or
brokers who are the focal actor’s leader) increases
the focal actor’s value-added, creating public ben-
efits. We argue that although second-order effects
may be negligible when one looks at all of an actor’s
contacts, some of whom are in poor positions to
leverage brokerage advantages, the second-order
networks that count come from contacts who pos-
sess both the requisite social capital (brokerage)
and the leverage that comes from rank.
THE EXTERNALITIES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
Social capital emerges from accumulated and on-
going social relationships (Bourdieu, 1986; Cole-
man, 1990). As capital, it is a source of value. Social
capital, however, is neither a quality of individuals,
as is “human capital” (Becker, 1983), nor is it a
quality of the discrete resources to which they have
access, as is “physical capital” (Portes, 1998).
Rather, it is a quality that exists between individu-
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als. Social capital is primarily about the relation-
ships that actors maintain, characterized in terms
of such features as number, strength, and density.
Considerable attention has been paid to the conse-
quences of social capital for individuals, such as
finding a job (Granovetter, 1973), advancing a career,
and gaining related social resources (Burt, 1992;
Ibarra, 1995; Podolny & Baron, 1997; Seibert,
Kraimer, & Liden, 2001), power (Brass & Burkhardt,
1993; Krackhardt, 1990), and compensation (Belli-
veau, O’Reilly, &Wade, 1996; Burt, 1992; Burt, 1997).
Notwithstanding the significant contribution of the
social capital literature to understanding individual-
level outcomes, it is lacking in several ways.
Outcomes: Who Benefits?
Although the influence of social capital on per-
sonal outcomes is clear, the impact of an employ-
ee’s social capital on the work and performance of
those around him/her is less clear. This perspective
on social capital differs from that of the mainstream
social capital research, offering an alternative an-
swer to the question, Who benefits? We argue that
an actor’s social capital can help him/her add value
to other colleagues, generating positive externali-
ties that go beyond the private gains to the actor
himself/herself. A concern with collective goods
was central to Coleman’s approach to social capital,
evident in his emphasis on social solidarity, or
“banding-together,” and how this improves collec-
tive outcomes—for example, lower drop-out rates
in student communities with robust connections
between families (Coleman, 1990). However, col-
lective benefits have been linked too closely and
singularly to a specific social structure: network
“closure,” defined as the presence of direct links
between all actors in a network (see also Putnam,
1995). An alternative path, the one we pursue here,
is to consider how mechanisms such as bridging
and brokerage, which are most often associated
with private individual benefits, can also result in
spillovers that produce collective goods. Our field
may have prematurely and excessively coupled
certain mechanisms with certain outcomes: broker-
age with private goods and closure with collective
benefits.
Research in two related subfields has strength-
ened the general interest in such benefits. Research
on citizenship behavior—both organizational (Pod-
sakoff, Ahearne, & MacKenzie, 1997; Podsakoff,
MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000; Sparrowe,
Liden, Wayne, & Kraimer, 2001) and interpersonal
(Bowler & Brass, 2006; Settoon & Mossholder,
2002)—and research on cooperation (Smith et al.,
1995) look at acts in which individuals go beyond
the confines of job descriptions and exhibit extra-
role behaviors that contribute to peer and organiza-
tional performance. These literature streams are
important because organizations increasingly re-
quire fluid peer-to-peer information exchange and
support (Smith et al., 1995). However, neither citi-
zenship nor cooperation research has sufficiently
explored the social network drivers (in particular,
structural properties versus simply a number of
contacts or a dyadic property such as liking) of
cooperation or citizenship behavior (for an excep-
tion see Sparrowe et al. [2001]). Also, research on
cooperation tends not to answer the question of
whether value is generated; a peer may have been
cooperative, but that does not necessarily mean
that value was created for others. Although our
study takes seriously the claim that peer-to-peer
acts of cooperation or citizenship are important for
firms, we both contribute a social network perspec-
tive on structural mechanisms and measure recip-
ients’ perceptions of actual value-added.
Orders of Social Capital
Externalities in social structure occur when a
contact’s network (i.e., its members) influence not
only their own work (first-order effects occur) but
spill over and impact the focal actor to whom they
were connected (second-order effects occur). The
idea that the network of an actor’s contacts can
have an effect on this actor is not alien to network
studies. For example, it is central to Bonacich’s
(1987) model of power, in which the power of an
ego can be affected by the power of his/her alters.
Yet the idea has remained largely associated with
measuring an actor’s network centrality as a func-
tion of the centrality of his/her contacts. Further-
more, related measures, such as “betweenness cen-
trality,” which include direct and indirect contacts
in the assessment, combine first-order and second-
order structures in a way that makes it problematic
to discern their separate effects (Burt, 2007). When
the link to individual outcomes is made, the mech-
anism invoked is the effect of affiliation with the
high-status (i.e., central) player as a signal of the
unobserved qualities of the focal actor (Podolny,
1994). The effects of second-order social capital on
outcomes relevant to the individual actor have not
been amply explored. Exceptions are rare; only one
that we know of explores the generalized benefits
of second-order social capital—that is, how the so-
cial structure of all secondary contacts (on average)
impacts the performance of a focal actor. Burt’s
(2007) study of managers, bankers, and analysts
indicated that constraint among alters’ networks
(second-order social capital) has no effect on ego’s
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performance once ego’s constraint (first-order so-
cial capital) is taken into account.
These returns to brokerage are higher for first-
order contacts than for second-order contacts for at
least three good reasons; Burt emphasizes the first
two, we add the third. First, second-order contacts
will be less valuable when resource flows are not
fluid—for example, when knowledge is “sticky” or
when the context is highly politicized. In such a
context (a competitive business organization is a
good example), direct relationships are important
to information flows, and so brokering among pri-
mary contacts should be more effective than broker-
ing among secondary contacts. Second, there is an
established propensity for actors to “search locally”
and display poor vision beyond their local social and
physical context (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; So-
renson & Stuart, 2001). Human propensity for the
familiar and local, then, may make primary contacts
more consequential than secondary contacts.
Finally, there is at least one other reason why
first-order contacts—on average—may appear more
consequential than second-order contacts. This has
to do with one’s perspective on social capital. So
far, we have compared the relative merits of pri-
mary and secondary contacts as two monolithic
bodies. Primary contacts are advantageous on aver-
age insofar as it is more efficient for ego to leverage
primary contacts than secondary contacts. But
what if not all primary contacts are the same? What
if differences among primary contacts are conse-
quential to how their social capital spills over to a
focal actor? Looking for benefits to second-order
social capital in this case means avoiding the idea
of a contest between primary and secondary alters
and embracing that of a search for the contingent
effects of second-order social capital. Some pri-
mary contacts may be in a good position to amplify
the benefits of their social capital (brokerage) to
ego’s advantage; others will not be and may render
inert—in terms of the spillover benefits to ego—the
same structure. We explore these contingencies be-
low, but this logic offers the third reason why a
competition between first-order and average sec-
ond-order social capital benefits is likely to favor
the former: averaging the social capital of direct
contacts may wash out any contingent second-or-
der effects. If two contacts both have large amounts
of social capital (nonredundant networks), but cap-
turing these second-order benefits as spillovers to
ego relies heavily on discerning contacts in some
other fashion, then simply collapsing (averaging)
the social capital of alters is likely to dilute the
effects.
There are good reasons to expect that second-
order social capital matters when it is associated
with certain contacts. For example, Bielby and
Bielby (1999) found that film and television talent
agencies that spanned diverse functional areas
(e.g., writing, finance, production, directing, acting,
and distribution)—in other words, brokers—were
better able to help their clients (screenwriters) dis-
cover new opportunities. Presumably, screenwrit-
ers have many more people in their networks than
just their agents, and yet it is compelling to focus
on agents as the primary contacts and examine if
their social structures have benefits for screenwrit-
ers. Bielby and Bielby also found that “core” agen-
cies (those initiating projects and having consider-
able elite status) were particularly beneficial for
their clients. This finding suggests mechanisms
that combine the social structure of these contacts
(brokerage) and other relevant features (role/rela-
tion) in explaining the second-order benefits for
clients.
Sparrowe and Liden’s (2005) study of influence
and leader-member exchange (LMX) particularly
highlights the importance of capturing some com-
bination of structural and role/relational contin-
gencies when exploring second-order social capi-
tal. Employees who were regarded as particularly
influential tended to have strong LMX relations
and central locations in advice networks, but the
presence of a leader who was also centrally located
in the advice network and shared a similar network
(sponsorship) with the subordinate positively mod-
erated these drivers of perceived influence. These
findings are suggestive, pointing to an indirect in-
fluence of a leader’s social capital on a subordi-
nate’s power, implying that second-order social
capital can matter if one focuses on the relevant
contingencies. A few related studies also point in
this direction. Mehra, Dixon, Brass, and Robertson
(2006) found that group performance in the sales
division of a financial services firm was higher
when a group’s leader was more centrally located
in his/her friendship network (although the focus
was on group-level effects, not individual-level
performance). Katz, Tushman, and Allen (1995)
found that R&D staff in a chemical research facility
were more likely to be promoted along paths that
were similar to the career profiles of their supervi-
sors, and gatekeeping supervisors increased promo-
tion chances (although there were no measures of
network structure). Bono and Anderson (2005)
found that leaders with “transformational” person-
ality traits were more highly sought out (had high
“in-degree centrality”) and were associated with
direct reports who also had high in-degree central-
ity (although mechanisms ran through transforma-
tional leadership characteristics, rather than any
network properties of the leader). In sum, these
1216 OctoberAcademy of Management Journal
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studies suggest that the leader role is a special one,
and so a leader’s social capital may have spillover
effects exceeding those of the average alter. Build-
ing on the work of Sparrowe and Liden, we also
contend below that a leader’s social capital should
have consequences for a focal actor, and not only
for his/her reputation for influence but also for
his/her value-added. Our choice of leaders as the
focus of our study of second-order social capital is
motivated by their relevance to subordinates’ abil-
ity to add value to others. Leaders, however, may
vary in the extent to which they contribute to such
value-added. We will argue that this variance is
related to whether a leader is also a broker.
Our concern, however, is with second-order so-
cial capital and positive externalities generally, not
with a specific role, which leads us to wonder
whether the leader role is a special case of a more
general phenomenon. The question is whether
more general contact attributes are also likely to
reveal spillover benefits. Given the countless ways
to slice up these relations, we explore the level of
seniority of the brokers to which a focal actor is
connected. This is a reasonable place to explore
second-order social capital for several reasons.
First, an employee’s leader is, in essence, the most
senior role in the working life of the employee.
Dictionary definitions of seniority express a com-
bination of elements such as formal authority, rank,
and experience. A focal actor’s leader typically cap-
tures all three aspects, but although the leader has
exclusive formal authority, other contacts in the
focal actor’s network can also be of higher rank, a
feature that may be consequential for social capi-
tal’s positive externalities.
Second, recent theorizing on the brokerage strat-
egy (Brass, 2009) (i.e., targeting primary contacts
whose own networks offer nonredundant connec-
tions) paves the way for more consideration of the
role of contact as broker. Brass wrote, “The irony of
the brokerage strategy is that the new contact also
becomes a broker between her own contacts and
us” (2009: 265). In seeking the broker advantage,
focal actors must themselves risk being brokered.
Contacts who indirectly connect a player to unfa-
miliar people and resources will enjoy the same
benefits of brokering that the player seeks. This is a
contact that comes with substantial risk. Seeking
contacts as brokers increases uncertainty, decreases
control, and demands additional “face-time” to
manage and leverage relationships. Why would
anyone seek them out? Brass answers that such
contacts, because of their advantageous structural
(network) positions, amass resources and reputa-
tions that can create such high value that it justifies
the risks. The point Brass makes is that players
want to maximize their returns on these risky rela-
tions. They are more likely to do so, we suggest,
when a contact-as-broker has features that offer
greater guarantees of influence, access, and rele-
vant insight. Rank and formal authority can offer
such additional guarantees and moderate the ben-
efits of contacts rich in brokering opportunities.
This is because these features can complement bro-
kerage. Brokerage, technically, is only about having
alters who are disconnected. As we argue below,
rank and formal authority can help ensure (a) better
resources through better quality of alters at the ends
of (disconnected or brokered) relations, (b) better
(“wiser”) accumulated perspectives with which to
interpret and synthesize (diverse or nonredundant)
information, and (c) more power to move upon
those ideas and acquire resources.
To sum, although role/relational and structural
features of contacts can be thought of as substitutes,
it is better for a focal actor to seek them as comple-
ments. The implication for second-order social cap-
ital effects is that researchers need to look at struc-
ture and role in combination. Second-order effects
may become particularly pronounced when actors
connect to brokers who are senior; or, stated differ-
ently, connecting to senior contacts is better when
they are brokers.
Brokers of Higher Rank
The general proposition is that being connected
to brokers brings benefits, and more benefits than
being connected to alters with a dense network. On
the one hand, having contacts with dense networks
should ease resource extraction. Dense networks
generate strong, trusting relationships, which
should facilitate resource circulation and release.
Also, social norms, which are more likely to exist
in dense networks (Podolny & Baron, 1997), are
allies in resource extraction, particularly because
these norms often involve some aspect of coopera-
tion and reciprocity (Coleman, 1990). Focal actors
may benefit from the surer flow of information and
reciprocity operating within a contact’s dense net-
work. Dense networks, however, create constraints.
The problem with contacts who maintain dense
networks, and particularly in large firms, is that
cliquishness and excessive attention to the local
group can result. Brass pointed out (2009: 265) the
additional irony that even when connecting to a
clique, a focal actor must rely on a broker as an
access point, but for such brokers cooperation and
support for the focal actor outside the fold may be
difficult because attention and loyalty are absorbed
by the strong in-group (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000).
The focal actor who is not part of the clique may
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receive fewer spillovers from a contact so situated,
and such a contact is likely to choose his local
clique over the focal actor when compromise is
necessary (Brass, 2009; Fernandez-Mateo, 2007).
On the other hand, connecting to brokers is ad-
vantageous. Much of this benefit hinges on the
diversity of information and bridging opportunities
created by the lack of connection between a bro-
ker’s alters (Burt, 1992). First, when there is a lack
of connection between contacts, service profession-
als should have more diverse information, knowl-
edge, or perspectives at their disposal than they
would have if the contacts were connected. This
should enhance creativity (Rodan & Galunic, 2004).
Focal actors connected to brokers should find that
such contacts have good ideas, which in turn
should enhance the focal actor’s ability to add
value to his/her contacts. Bridging is also more
likely to occur for actors connected to brokers.
Bridging situations occur where there are opportu-
nities to connect actors in a mutually useful way.
These actors are not necessarily unaware of each
other, but they are not fully aware of the comple-
mentary resources each holds and the connection
benefits. Although having sparse networks alone
does not guarantee diverse resources (Obstfeld,
2005), brokering opportunities are less likely for
those connected to people with dense networks:
being connected to a broker should expand the
potential for bridging opportunities. Being bridged,
a focal actor has more opportunities to add value to
people s/he may not have connected with
otherwise.
However, not all brokers are the same. The struc-
ture of their networks creates the potential for val-
ue-adding resource flows and connections. But that
capacity must be viewed against the natural re-
source access afforded a focal actor by a broker’s
role or situation. For example, as in the talent
agency scenario in Bielby and Bielby (1999), just
because a talent agent possesses a network rich in
“structural holes” does not guarantee that she or he
will be capable of adding value to major screenwrit-
ers—it is hard to imagine a junior talent agent, even
one with abundant social capital, adding substan-
tial value to a senior screenwriter such as William
Goldman (e.g., All the President’s Men) or Oliver
Stone (e.g., Midnight Express). Presumably talent
agents servicing senior screenwriters require ade-
quate clout themselves, not just diverse networks.
How a focal actor can extract value from connecting
to a broker requires some amount of “relativism,”
or a consideration of the comparative standing of
the focal actor vis-à-vis the broker. Brass suggested
as much when, in answering the question of
“whom to use” (which broker), he offered a relative
answer: “Connecting to those with similar or more
power can offer significant advantages” (2009:
267). We extend this argument to hierarchical busi-
ness settings and propose that a determinant of
comparative standing or power is not only network
structure but also relative rank. The idea is to con-
sider the combined power available to focal actors
of connecting to those not only rich in structural
holes but also of more senior rank.
Having brokers of higher rank should enhance
the benefits they bring to a focal actor. Above, we
listed three mechanisms that may moderate sec-
ond-order effects: alter quality, perspective quality,
and influence. Having contacts of higher rank
should operate largely through the first and third
mechanisms. First, higher-rank brokers, ceteris pa-
ribus, should have access to better people (more
in-the-know, more influential). Rank or position is
one key source of status (Lin, 1999), and status
facilitates access to the stars and influencers in an
organization. As Lin summarized, evidence is am-
ple that the position (such as the rank) of ego pos-
itively affects ego’s level of social resources (the
resources at the ends of networks). This is a pow-
erful combination; actors should do better when
their contacts are rich in social capital (nonredun-
dant information and brokering opportunities) and
have higher rank (better resources at the ends of
ties). Having such senior brokers should help the
focal actors add value within their organization
through the spillover of these resources and oppor-
tunities that flow through such contacts. Second,
rank brings greater power. In some ways, this is the
whole point of rank: to create roles high in a hier-
archy with concentrated decision rights, creating
levers that move an organization. Although a focal
actor with contacts who are rich in social capital
should have more channels with which to add
value, that capacity will be boosted when such
brokers are also of higher rank.
Finally, for brokers of higher rank, reduced neg-
ative effects of dense networks should boost the
benefits of wide-spanning networks. Although
dense networks should ease resource access, high-
er-ranking players are not as dependent on social
structure to extract resources. Rank may be a sub-
stitute for social cohesion when it comes to getting
the resources senior professionals require (Gar-
giulo, Ertug, & Galunic, 2009). Conversely, senior
managers may suffer substantial knowledge and
perspective loss in the presence of redundant ties.
Our hypothesis is expressed in relative terms: it
is the relative rank of a contact and focal actor that
should matter because we are interested in what
those contacts can do for the focal actor beyond
what his/her own rank can achieve:
1218 OctoberAcademy of Management Journal
6
Hypothesis 1. The value an actor adds to oth-
ers increases when that actor is connected to
contacts with sparse networks (brokers) who
are of higher rank.
Boss as Broker/Broker as Boss
As noted, creating value for others should also be
influenced by the social capital of an employee’s
leader, a key high-ranking figure in an employee’s
working life. Given the prominence of the leader
role, assorted mechanisms are likely to be relevant
in explaining the value of a leader who is also a
broker. First, the leader role should naturally mo-
tivate occupants to broker information and re-
sources for subordinates. This is partly because
leadership roles normally necessitate connecting
subordinates to resources, and partly because lead-
ers often stand to gain when their subordinates
perform well, which they are more likely to do
when well equipped by the leader. Although the
alignment of interests should motivate brokering,
we should expect variance in the ability of leaders
to do it (Fernandez, 1991; Sparrowe & Liden, 2005).
Leaders will provide exceptional brokering when
the access to information and knowledge they pro-
vide is comprehensive, extending into places nor-
mally outside their employees’ reach. Leaders who
are also brokers are more likely to deliver necessary
resources. Such boss-brokers are more likely to tap
into hard-to-come-by data, gain knowledge of the
activities of a neighboring department, access key
people, and connect to external bodies. Leaders
who are not brokers are less likely to equip subor-
dinates adequately, hampering their ability to add
value to others.
Another way to think about the advantages of the
boss-broker combination is to start from the other
direction and consider what the leader role is likely
to add to a mere broker role. Subordinates certainly
require more than just brokering: they need con-
tacts who will help interpret information and offer
advice. Although some close contacts may offer
such support, the normative pressures on leaders,
and their development path into leadership roles,
should make them particularly motivated to offer
counsel. Brokers so ordained, with obligations to
support and guide, are likely to be particularly
useful contacts. Subordinates connected to such
boss-brokers should be more valuable to those
around them.
Finally, positive reputation effects may accrue to
leaders who are also brokers. Individuals who oc-
cupy brokering positions are perceived as powerful
(Brass & Burkhardt, 1993; Pfeffer, 1992). Leaders
who are perceived as powerful will have high ac-
cess to resources and a high likelihood of being
approached with opportunities, which can trickle
down to subordinates and enhance their value-
added. Reputation effects may have other conse-
quences, potentially impacting subordinate moti-
vation to assist peers. Mehra et al. (2006) found that
leaders who were well connected (central) enjoyed
stronger reputations as leaders. This finding is sug-
gestive: social structure may magnify the perceived
leadership qualities of a boss, and so people regard
the well-connected boss-broker as having high
competence, which can motivate extra outreach be-
haviors by subordinates. Subordinates with influ-
ential bosses may be motivated to increase their
support of peers also because doing so offers op-
portunities for status display—for showing off their
connection to a powerful boss-broker.
Hypothesis 2. The value an actor adds to oth-
ers increases with the sparseness of his/her
leader’s social network.
In sum, we contend that although not all second-
order social networks matter to the focal actor in
creating value for others, the advantages of con-
necting to brokers will be tangible when those bro-
kers are also senior contacts (higher-ranking or
leaders).
DATA AND METHODS
We tested our hypotheses using data on value-
added ratings for some 2,200 bankers working in a
global investment bank, data obtained as part of a
larger research project (Gargiulo et al., 2009).
Global securities banks operate in a complex indus-
try. Decisions regarding which businesses/prod-
ucts a firm will compete in, how it will compete,
and how resources will be allocated are made via
the contribution of numerous experts and depart-
ments in the firm (Eccles & Crane, 1988). To meet
client demands and strict deadlines, a bank needs
to mobilize and recombine its resident body of
knowledge in ways that allow for quick readjust-
ment to changing circumstances. In this context,
fluid informal networks of cooperation that cut
across the functional and regional units of the bank
are necessary.
In the course of ongoing work, an investment
banker interacts with numerous colleagues who
provide her/him with information and knowledge
or who utilize the information and knowledge
she/he generates for their own work. Recognition
for the value added by a service professional is
often measured through a process in which objec-
tive metrics—where they exist—are combined with
the perceptions of other relevant members. This is
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the case with the firm we studied: Once a year,
members in the four top ranks (associate director,
director, executive director, and managing director)
are asked to identify people with whom they have
had business interactions during the past year and
to indicate how much value this person added to
their work. The response rate is usually very high
(98 percent for our data). The firm uses software
that allows employees to rate the value added to
them by colleagues in related functional units, se-
lected on the basis of the interdependence between
units. The software imposes a restriction to pre-
empt potential rating inflation; each employee is
expected to rank his/her business contacts into four
categories according to the value they added to
his/her work in a way that yields approximately the
same number of contacts in each category.
We used these interemployee ratings to create a
binary square matrix representing the network of
working relationships in the bank. Each cell in this
matrix contains a value of 0 or 1, depending on
whether employee i, occupying the row, has rated
employee j, occupying the column. We comple-
mented the network data with background informa-
tion, rank, tenure, and mean rating received. We
also had information on the unit and leader of each
employee. Forty unit leaders oversaw the opera-
tions of 41 units (2 units had the same leader). Our
sample includes all the members of these units, but
not the leaders. We excluded the leaders from our
sample since data were not available for their
bosses.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is the aver-
age rating received by an employee from all those
who rated her/him in a given year (data were col-
lected in 2001). The rating reflects the rater’s as-
sessment of the rated person in terms of his/her
usefulness and overall provision of help specifi-
cally to the rater, something considered important
at this bank. The raters are explicitly reminded in
the instructions that their ratings should be based
solely on this criterion rather than on their percep-
tion of the individual’s general popularity or con-
tribution to the bank as a whole. Average rating
received has a significant correlation with compen-
sation (r  .21, p  .001), which is to be expected
since management takes into account an employ-
ee’s mean rating in compensation deliberations.
The average rating received by an employee cap-
tures the extent to which an employee adds value
to the work of other bankers, which is the focus of
this study.
Independent Variables: Measuring First-Order
and Second-Order Social Capital
Network density is the number of ties among
those who either rated or who were rated (i.e.,
alters) by a focal actor (i.e., ego) as a percentage of
all possible ties. If none of the alters work with (i.e.,
rated) each other, density is zero. Density increases
as more alters work with (rate) each other. The
lower the density, the sparser the ego network,
meaning a greater percentage of nonredundant con-
tacts and increased brokering opportunities for ego.
This is our measure of the employee’s first-order
social capital: the sparser the network, the greater
the social capital. For second-order social capital,
we use the following two measures, in line with our
hypotheses: Network density of higher-rank alters
is the average of the network density of contacts
whose rank in the organization was higher than
that of the focal actor. Network density of leader is
the network density of the focal actor’s leader.
Control Variables
We included control variables for factors that
might affect rating received and whose effects
might be confounded with those of network den-
sity. As we study the effects of both first-order and
second-order social capital, our control variables
are at both levels.
In estimating the effect of network density of
higher-rank alters, we controlled for network den-
sity of same-rank alters, measured as the average
network density of contacts whose rank in the or-
ganization was the same as that of a focal actor, and
network density of lower-rank alters, which is the
average network density of contacts whose rank in
the organization was lower than that of the focal
actor. We included these variables to ensure that
any second-order effect from higher-rank alters’ so-
cial capital indeed comes from them and not from
these other sets of alters. (In our post hoc analysis,
to illustrate/replicate Burt’s findings, we also refer
to the network density of all alters, which is the
average network density of all contacts).1
Network size is the number of contacts in ego’s
network—that is, those who have either rated or
been rated by a focal actor. Because size is typically
negatively correlated with network density, con-
1 If we enter network density of all alters and network
density of higher rank alters in the samemodel, and the two
network sizes for these sets of alters, our results remain the
same—with network density of all alters not significant (p
 .25) and network density of higher-rank alters having a
negative and significant coefficient (p  .01).
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trolling for size is necessary to obtain reliable esti-
mates of the effect of network density on average
rating received. We controlled for the network size
of both focal actor and relevant alter, depending on
the model (i.e., network size of higher-rank alters,
network size of same-rank alters, network size of
lower-rank alters, network size of leader, and also
network size of all alters where relevant). As with
network density, we used the average of the net-
work sizes of the relevant set of alters for each
variable. We log-transformed the network size
variables.
We also included background variables, captur-
ing a number of employee, leader, and contact (al-
ter) attributes that may have an effect on an em-
ployee’s ability to add value to others. These
include demographic variables (gender, age, ten-
ure) as well as organizational position (rank) and
team size. Gender and leader gender are indicator
variables, set to 1 for males. Proportion of male
alters is the proportion of a focal actor’s contacts
who are male. Age and leader age are ages at the
time of data collection. Average age of alters is the
average age of the focal actor’s contacts. Tenure and
leader tenure measure the number of years each
person has been with the firm up to that point.
Average tenure of alters is the average tenure of the
focal actor’s contacts. Age is correlated with tenure,
but the correlation is not very strong in our data (r
 .41). Including both variables allowed us to par-
cel out the effects of tenure and age.
We controlled for the hierarchical position (rank)
of an employee and his/her unit leader, as well as
for the proportion of the employee’s contacts in
each rank. Our data cover the four top ranks in the
firm (associate director, director, executive direc-
tor, and managing director). We accounted for the
effects of the employee’s rank by using indicator
variables, managing director being the omitted cat-
egory. Of the 40 team leaders, 33 were managing
directors, 6 were executive directors, and 1 was a
director. We used one indicator variable,managing
director leader, which was set to 1 if the unit leader
was a managing director and 0 if he/she was an
executive director or director. Using two indicator
variables to capture leader rank (with “director” as
the omitted category) changed none of our results
but increased multicollinearity in every model.
Thus, we used one indicator variable for leader
rank. For the employee’s contacts (alters), we used
three variables to capture the proportion of alters
who were associate directors, directors, and exec-
utive directors (with the managing director alters
being the omitted proportion).
We also controlled for team size, or the number
of employees in an employee’s unit, to capture
effects that might impact the employee’s ability to
add value to others. Finally, we controlled for
leader average rating and average rating of alters.
Characteristics of a leader that are not captured by
social capital may affect a leader’s ability to help
subordinates add value. Entering the average rating
received by a leader in our models allowed us to
control for these characteristics. We constructed a
similar variable for the employee’s contacts (alters),
averaging the average rating received by each con-
tact of the focal employee.
Estimation
Because in our data employees are nested within
units managed by leaders, we used a multilevel
model to test our hypotheses (Raudenbush & Bryk,
2002). This allowed us to account for group-level
differences in value added to others (differences in
value-added by unit membership—variation across
groups—were indeed significant [p  .001]) and to
obtain unbiased estimates for the standard errors of
the regression coefficients. In our models, in addi-
tion to the numerous level 1 variables we entered
variables related to team size and leader, where
relevant, at level 2.2
The number of observations in our estimation
samples varies over the set of models we use. In
models 1–3, in which we test Hypothesis 1 by
estimating the effect of the network density of high-
er-rank alters, our estimation sample consists of all
employees who have at least one contact of a higher
rank than her-/himself and at least one of a lower
rank than her-/himself. This means that the sample
for models 1–3 consists of all the directors and
executive directors in the organization (people in
the two ranks in the middle of the four ranks we
have who could thus have higher-, same-, and low-
er-rank contacts). In model 4, in which we test
Hypothesis 2 by estimating the effect of the net-
work density of leader, we use the full sample,
since every (nonleader) employee in our sample, in
all four ranks, has a leader. In model 5, our test of
whether the network density of leader and network
density of higher-rank alters maintain their signif-
icant effects when entered together, our estimation
sample then includes all employees who can have
contacts who are higher ranked than themselves—
2 Recall that 40 leaders were responsible for 41 units.
We used units as level 2 groups in models testing Hy-
pothesis 1 and leaders as level 2 groups in testing Hy-
pothesis 2. The results we will report for the hypothe-
sized effects remain significant (at the same levels of
significance) if we use either units or leaders as level 2
groups in all models.
2012 1221Galunic, Ertug, and Gargiulo
9
consisting of associate directors, directors, and ex-
ecutive directors (three of the four ranks, omitting
managing directors, who cannot have any contacts
above them). The tables indicate the number of
observations in each of our models.
RESULTS
Table 1 displays means, standard deviations, and
correlations for the variables. The mean average
rating received is 2.67. On a scale from 1 to 4, this
is close to the midpoint, given the flat distribution
imposed on the raters. The employees in our sam-
ple had been with the firm for slightly more than
six years on average and were mostly male. Net-
works of employees tended to be denser than those
of team leaders, as we would expect. That the net-
works of team leaders are substantially larger (p 
.001) than those of employees is one reason for this
difference. The large average network sizes (106 for
employees, 240 for unit leaders) confirm the impor-
tance of collaboration in this industry. Network
size and density are negatively correlated and, in
line with past research, we considered controlling
for size necessary to have valid assessments of the
effects of density. Although we report the means
and standard deviations for the variables as they
were calculated, before entering them in our mod-
els, we divided all network density variables, as
well as all age, gender, and tenure variables, by 10,
and we divided team size by 100. This division
offers easier presentation of our results, keeping the
coefficients to two decimal places.
Table 2 presents the results of the models we
used in testing Hypothesis 1. Model 1 presents the
baseline model with the control variables for the
focal actor and alters. Among the significant vari-
ables, the average rating of alters (i.e., alter quality)
and employee’s network size have positive effects
on the rating received, but employee’s age, with
his/her tenure controlled for, has a negative effect
on rating received. Model 2 adds two network vari-
ables for all (average) alters: network size and net-
work density. Without distinguishing alters in
terms of their seniority, or in any other way, Burt
(2007) did not find an effect of second-order capital
calculated in a similar way. We used this model to
show that we also found that the average network
density of all the contacts of a focal actor (“average”
second-order social capital) has no significant ef-
fect on the focal actor’s value-added.
Model 3 adds to model 1 the network variables
used to test Hypothesis 1. Because of the high cor-
relations among the six network indexes (one pair
of network size and density figures each for higher-
rank, same-rank, and lower-rank alters), which in-
flate standard errors, we used an orthogonalization
procedure to partial out common variance among
them. In particular, we employed a Gram-Schmidt
procedure (Golub & Van Loan, 1996), as imple-
mented in the “orthog” command in Stata 11. This
procedure generates new orthogonalized measures
for the six network indexes. Where we had more
than one set of second-order social capital mea-
sures in other models, we likewise used this or-
thogonalization method to ensure stable results.3
We observed that the average network density of
contacts who are higher-ranked than a focal actor
has a significant, negative effect (p  .01) on rating
received, supporting Hypothesis 1. Neither the net-
work density of contacts who have the same rank as
a focal actor nor the network density of contacts
who have lower rank than the focal actor has a
significant effect (p  .50). If we added only the
network density and network size of higher-rank
alters (without adding the corresponding measures
for same-rank and lower-rank alters, as above), we
had the same negative and significant effect for
network density of higher-rank alters (p  .01). On
the other hand, if we added the network density
and network size of same-rank and lower-rank al-
ters on their own, neither network density here had
a significant effect (p  .30). These results confirm
the main result we present, with all three sets of
second-order social capital indexes entered to-
gether, in model 3.
Table 3 presents the results of the models we
used in testing Hypothesis 2. Model 4 adds the
leader-level control variables and the leader-level
network indexes, to test Hypothesis 2. As men-
tioned, for this model, we used unit leaders as
level 2 groups. We see that the network density of
the focal actor’s leader has a significant negative
effect (p  .01) on rating received, supporting Hy-
pothesis 2. We also wanted to test if the second-order
social capital coming from a focal actor’s leader has
3 This orthogonalization procedure has been used in
studies where concerns about high multicollinearity
among a set of variables was a concern (e.g., Hiatt, Sine,
& Tolbert, 2009; Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Sine, David, &
Mitsuhashi, 2007). As an indication of the level of mul-
ticollinearity introduced by the three sets of second-
order social capital measures, the variance inflation fac-
tors (VIFs) of three of the six nonorthogonalized network
measures are above 10 (with the VIFs for the other three
between 7.4 and 10). No other variable in other models
has a VIF of above 4.4. The variables produced by the
orthogonalization procedure are such that each variable
now has variance not explained by a linear combination
of the other variables in the orthogonalized set of
variables.
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an effect above and beyond the second-order social
capital coming from higher-rank alters in general. To
do this, in model 5 we added to model 4 both the
control variables at the contacts level (as in models
1–3) and the two social network indexes for higher-
rank alters. The indicator variable for executive direc-
tor (the rank of the focal employees) is not included in
this model because the estimation sample now con-
sists of all associate directors, directors, and execu-
tive directors (since managing directors cannot have
any higher-rank contacts and therefore cannot have
any corresponding network indicators for second-or-
TABLE 2
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Average Rating Received, Testing Hypothesis 1a
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Tenure 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Gender 0.52 0.44 0.45
(0.30) (0.29) (0.29)
Director 0.06* 0.05* 0.06*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Team size 0.08* 0.03 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Average rating of alters 0.50* 0.51** 0.50**
(0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
Average age of alters 0.24** 0.16 0.18*
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Average tenure of alters 0.05 0.02 0.03
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Proportion of male alters 0.77 1.56 1.35
(2.22) (2.21) (2.25)
Proportion of associate director alters 0.72*** 0.39* 0.65***
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19)
Proportion of director alters 0.28 0.06 0.32
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Proportion of executive director alters 0.11 0.19 0.04
(0.21) (0.21) (0.23)
Network size 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.18***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Network density 0.02 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Network size of all alters 0.31***
(0.07)
Network density of alters 0.06
(0.04)
Network size of higher-rank alters 0.03
(0.02)
Network density of higher-rank alters 0.05**
(0.02)
Network size of lower-rank alters 0.04**
(0.01)
Network density of lower-rank alters 0.01
(0.01)
Network size of same-rank alters 0.01
(0.01)
Network density of same-rank alters 0.01
(0.01)
Log-likelihood 443.16 433.81 434.10
n 1,229 1,229 1,229
a Team size (group) is based on 40 cases. Unstandardized coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. The change in
deviance statistic is significant (p  .01) for the two pairs of nested models, i.e., model 1 to model 2 and model 1 to model 3.
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
Two-tailed tests.
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der social capital). Thus, “executive director,” instead
of “managing director,” becomes the omitted cate-
gory. Using the orthogonalized second-order social
capital measures, we see that both the network den-
sity of a focal actor’s leader (p .05) and the network
density of higher-rank alters (p  .01) have negative
and significant coefficients. This result suggests that
the second-order social capital coming from a focal
employee’s leader has a significant effect that goes
above and beyond the significant second-order social
capital coming from higher-rank contacts. Both
matter.
To summarize, although second-order social cap-
ital calculated simply as the average network den-
sity of all contacts and second-order social capital
calculated as the average network density of same-
rank or lower-rank contacts have no significant ef-
fects on focal actors’ value-added, second-order so-
cial capital that targets contacts who are of higher
rank has a significant effect on the focal actors’
value-added, supporting Hypothesis 1. Likewise,
we find that the focal actor’s leader’s social capital
has a significant effect on the focal actor’s value-
added, supporting Hypothesis 2. Thus, we have
consistent support for our hypotheses. Further-
more, we also see, in model 5, that these two effec-
tive sources of second-order social capital, higher-
rank contacts and leader, do work in conjunction,
whereby each constitutes a statistically significant
source of social capital in the presence of the other.
We ran additional models to test some other im-
plications of our theory. Our core findings focus on
two aspects of alter seniority (higher rank and for-
mal authority) in determining the contingencies
around second-order social capital effectiveness. It
might also be the case that the efficacy of second-
order social capital varies with attributes of a focal
actor. In particular, we wondered whether focal
actors of low rank or with little experience in the
bank benefited simply from the general measure of
average second-order social capital (which has no
effect on the average focal actor). Just as second-
order social capital is effective when it comes from
more senior contacts, it might be that second-order
social capital, even that coming from all contacts,
might matter to focal actors who are new in the
organization or of low rank. Such a finding would
be consistent with our arguments.
To test the above ideas, we added two interaction
terms to model 2, for which our estimation sample
includes all employees, in all four ranks (n 
2,201), since for all focal employees with any con-
tacts at all we were able to calculate the network
density of all alters (the nonindicator variables
were centered before the calculation of the interac-
tions; we calculated the range of significance of the
TABLE 3
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Average
Rating Received, Testing Hypothesis 2a
Variable Model 4 Model 5
Age .09*** .10***
(.01) (.02)
Tenure .03 .04*
(.02) (.02)
Gender .01 .09
(.21) (.22)
Associate director .02 .16***
(.07) (.04)
Director .09 .07*
(.07) (.03)
Executive director .14
(.07)
Team size .07* .07
(.03) (.04)
Leader average rating .12 .13
(.06) (.07)
Leader age .01 .01
(.03) (.04)
Leader tenure .05 .04
(.03) (.03)
Leader gender 1.41** 1.25*
(.54) (.58)
Managing director leader .03 .05
(.06) (.06)
Network size .12*** .15***
(.02) (.02)
Network density .01 .01
(.01) (.01)
Network size of leader .16** .03
(.06) (.02)
Network density of leader .14** .03*
(.05) (.01)
Network size of higher rank alters .01
(.02)
Network density of higher rank alters .04**
(.01)
Average rating of alters .48**
(.15)
Average age of alters .14*
(.07)
Average tenure of alters .08
(.07)
Proportion of male alters 2.56
(1.68)
Proportion of associate director alters .52***
(.14)
Proportion of director alters .34*
(.14)
Proportion of executive director alters .02
(.17)
Log-likelihood 881.25 771.91
n 2,201 2,019
a Team size (group) and leader-level variables (group) are
based on 40 cases. Unstandardized coefficients and standard
errors (in parentheses) are reported. For a reduced sample of
2,019, the change in deviance statistic is significant (p  .01).
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
Two-tailed tests.
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combined overall effects reported below using the
procedure described in Preacher, Curran, and
Bauer [2006] and implemented in their accompa-
nying web utility). First, we added the interaction
between a focal actor’s tenure and the network
density of all alters. The interaction had a positive
and significant coefficient (p  .01), meaning that
the negative effect of the network density of all
alters became more pronounced as the focal actor
had less experience (tenure) in the firm. As before, the
main effect of the network density of all alters was not
significant on its own. However, after accounting for
the interaction with the tenure of the focal actor, we
saw that the overall effect of the network density of all
alters was negative and significant (p  .05) for 36
percent of our sample (for focal actors who had been
with the bank for at least 3.56 years below the mean).
The second interaction was between the associate
director rank (the lowest rank in our sample) and the
network density of all alters. This interaction had a
negative and significant coefficient (p  .01), show-
ing that the negative effect of the network density of
all alters got more pronounced for focal actors of the
lowest rank. Even though the main effect of the net-
work density of all alters was not significant, the
effect is negative and significant (p  .01) if the focal
actor was an associate director. Thus, the average
second-order social capital became a significant pre-
dictor of the value-added of focal actors who were of
lower rank or who had less experience/tenure in the
bank. Although not our explicit focus in this article,
these findings on the tenure and rank of the focal
actors are consistent with our general arguments.4
DISCUSSION
A compelling literature stream addresses the pri-
vate benefits of social capital. These benefits com-
prise job attainment, power, reputation, career prog-
ress, and compensation. In most cases, the benefits
are associated with the information and control ad-
vantages accruing to actors in brokerage positions
between disconnected contacts. In this article, we ask
whether individuals with networks rich in brokerage
social capital also benefit their contacts, making them
more valuable to others in their organization. This
question brings to the fore the discussion on the ex-
ternalities of social capital, a hitherto underexplored
theme. Confirming previous research (Burt, 2007), we
find that, on average, the social capital of a banker’s
contacts does not affect this banker’s ability to add
value to the people who seek his/her input. Yet this
result masks important differences among contacts.
We find that a banker connected to colleagues with
networks rich in brokerage social capital adds signif-
icantly more value to those seeking his or her input if
those colleagues also occupy a higher position in the
formal hierarchy of their firm. In addition to showing
that this result holds generally for higher-ranked con-
tacts, we also show that the leader of the banker’s
work unit still makes an independent contribution to
the banker’s ability to add value to others.
Our findings contribute to the nascent debate on
the externalities of social capital, highlighting the ef-
fects of the networks of an actor’s contacts on out-
comes associated with this actor. Specifically, we
show that the benefits of the networks of an actor’s
contacts are contingent on the role these contacts play
in the formal structure of the organization in which
actor and contacts work. This finding highlights the
importance of formal positions for unlocking the ben-
efits of second-order social capital. Prior research on
the contingent benefits of first-order social capital has
shown that (private) returns of social capital are con-
tingent on the role a focal actor plays in a firm, de-
fined either by the exclusivity of the role (Burt, 1997)
or by its position in the formal hierarchy of the firm
(Gargiulo et al., 2009). Our findings show that such an
interplay between formal and informal structure also
holds for second-order social capital, stressing the
impact of the informal network of senior colleagues
on their ability to help their associates add value to
others in their firm. Although being connected to
brokers in general is inconsequential for an actor’s
ability to add value to other colleagues, being con-
nected to higher-ranked brokers adds significantly to
this ability.
This finding both confirms and challenges recent
advances in studying second-order social capital.
Burt (2007) found that the network structure of an
actor’s contacts (second-order social capital) does
not matter once the effects of the structure of the
actor’s local network (first-order social capital) are
taken into account. In a subsequent book, Burt
(2010) explored whether this noneffect is valid for
two specific contacts in an actor’s network—his/
her boss and his/her “best-connected colleague.”
The association between the social capital of the
boss and the performance of the subordinate was
found to be in the expected direction but only
marginally significant in different samples (p .08,
one-tailed), although Burt was not able to test this
association in his sample of investment bankers
because boss-level measures were absent. Pursuing
the analysis at the industry level, Burt found sec-
ond-order effects. For example, transacting with
4 These additional results and the illustrative two-way
interaction plots (using the methods developed and im-
plemented by Preacher et al. (2006) are available upon
request.
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suppliers with low constraint boosted the perfor-
mance of a manufacturing firm. This finding led
him to argue that returns to second-order social
capital may be present at the industry level but not
within organizations because information may be
less sticky and social inhibition about exploiting
information and tapping into extended networks
lower in markets than in organizations. This is rea-
sonable, but it is also reasonable to expect variance
in information stickiness and in social inhibition
across industries. Investment banking may be the
type of industry in which information is less sticky
and inhibition lower, conditions suggesting that
the effects of second-order social capital should be
more noticeable. This is indeed what we found in
our sample. The effect is also marginally present in
Burt’s sample of investment bankers. When he ex-
amines the effect of the network of the best-con-
nected colleague on the performance of a focal ac-
tor, the average association across samples has a
t-test of 1.46 but rises to 1.64 for just the invest-
ment banking sample (p  .05, one-tailed). In other
words, Burt’s results suggest that, although still
marginal, second-order social capital matters more
in investment banking than in other industries. By
considering the formal position of the bearer of this
second-order social capital, we show that it actu-
ally matters significantly.
The finding that second-order social capital mat-
ters when it is associated with specific roles in an
actor’s network is consistent with recent work by
Wong and Boh (2010) and by Sparrowe and Liden
(2005). Wong and Boh (2010) found that the density
and heterogeneity of the network of what they
termed “peer advocates” influenced the reputation
of a focal manager. Sparrowe and Liden (2005)
found that the network centrality of bosses boosted
the influence of their subordinates. In both cases,
the value of second-order social capital for an actor
is only apparent when it is associated with specific
contacts. This research, as well as the current
study, confirms the need for finer-grained ap-
proaches that take context into account when de-
termining the contingencies that moderate the ef-
fect of second-order social capital on outcomes
associated with a focal actor.
We have argued that being connected to senior
contacts with networks rich in brokerage social cap-
ital increases an actor’s ability to add value to those
seeking his or her input; an alternative explanation,
however, is that being connected to a powerful, well-
connected senior colleague confers a “halo” of being
highly valuable, increasing colleagues’ perception of
the focal actor’s ability to add value. However, the
path of influence we highlight runs through the trans-
fer of knowledge, wisdom, or opportunity from a
(social-capital-rich) leader to a subordinate. The neg-
ative significance of leader network size corroborates
our mechanism. All else being equal, leaders with
smaller networks are associated with subordinates
who add greater value. Conversely, working for a
leader with a large network reduces a banker’s value-
added. This makes sense if leverage runs through
exchange and transference. Leaders with more ties to
maintain have less time to transfer knowledge, wis-
dom, or opportunities to subordinates. On the other
hand, leaderswith smaller networks should be able to
offer subordinates proper attention. The negative as-
sociation of leader network size and subordinate val-
ue-added would make less sense if leverage ran
mostly through reputation: if anything, we should
expect highly reputed leaders to garner larger, not
smaller, networks. A statistical test provides some
support for our interpretation. If we add the interac-
tion of leader network size and leader network den-
sity to model 4, the coefficient of the interaction vari-
able is negative, as expected, and marginally
significant (p  .08, one-tailed). In line with our rea-
soning, this finding suggests that when leaders’ net-
work density is controlled for, leaders with larger
networks, who are thus likely to have less time for
their teams or subordinates, have a lower effect on
howmuch value their teammembers or subordinates
add to the work of others. Overall, leaders are made
better informed and wiser through the structure of
their networks, but they need to have the time and
attention to extend those benefits to subordinates.
Formal Position, Informal Structure, and
Leadership: Managerial Implications
Our study on the effects of second-order social
capital vindicates the importance of the interaction
between formal and informal structure to the ef-
fects of social capital on outcomes. Contacts occu-
pying important positions in an organization’s for-
mal structure are consequential for a manager. This
is obvious in the specific role of the boss, but it is
also evident in mentorship relationships. Such re-
lationships contain “an intense interpersonal ex-
change between a senior experienced colleague
(mentor) and a less experienced junior colleague
(protégé)” (Russell & Adams, 1997: 3; cf. Payne &
Huffman, 2005). Mentorship, like leadership, has
been much researched, and its benefits well estab-
lished (Payne & Huffman, 2005). However, little
attention has gone to the social structure of mentors
and leaders. Take for instance research and advice
on leadership, which has been predominantly pre-
occupied with human capital. Much of the early
academic literature on leadership focused on the
personal traits of individuals, including “genius,”
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“charisma,” and “imagination” (Reicher, Haslam, &
Hopkins, 2005). Criticizing the oversimplicity and
lack of consistent evidence from the trait school of
thought, the popular contingency approach was
born, which brought context or situation more into
view. Here, successful leaders are those who dis-
play personal traits in the right place and at the
right time (Hersey, Blanchard, & Johnson, 1996).
But, as Heifetz (1994) pointed out, scholars with
either perspective are just as likely to place empha-
sis on the same traits. Relatedly, research on men-
torship has tended to explore the type of mentoring
(formal vs. informal, supervisor vs. nonsupervisor)
and the type of support (career-related vs. psycho-
logical) but without questioning the mentors’ social
structure.
Our study suggests the importance of not just
human capital but also social capital to the effec-
tiveness of mentors and leaders. We posit that a
senior member’s position in the social structure of
an organization is an important resource guiding
the work, effectiveness, and, more generally, devel-
opment of junior employees. That is, leaders and
mentors will influence subordinates not just be-
cause of their personality and intelligence but also
because of the quality of the information and
knowledge that come into their possession and,
over time, shape their way of thinking. Better se-
nior contacts are also those with better networks.
This view emphasizes the contextual nature of
leadership and mentoring, but without invoking
traditional contingency thinking (i.e., applying dif-
ferent traits at different times). Rather, this view
emphasizes the importance of information and
knowledge brokering to the role of leader-mentor.
For example, by tapping into the various and pos-
sibly exclusive communities of a company, senior
contacts may enhance their ability to broker oppor-
tunities and relationships for their subordinates, as
well as provide wiser (better informed and nu-
anced) council, and beyond what their positional
capital (rank) or human capital will allow alone.
Gladwell’s (1999) popular account of the Chicago
connector and social maven Lois Weisberg begins
with an account not of her personal triumphs but of
her life-changing influence on people she took un-
der her wing. That influence was not because of
Weisberg’s charisma or impressive social graces, as
Gladwell noted (1999: 3); rather, Lois was effective
for her “subordinates” because she was an incred-
ibly well connected person who excelled at linking
people with other people, ideas, and opportunities.
Recent research taking the emerging social iden-
tity approach to leadership suggests another way in
which occupying an advantageous network posi-
tion can enhance a leader’s ability to add value to
his or her associates. This research has emphasized
the extent to which leaders represent (are “proto-
typical” of) the identity and social categories of
their firm (Reicher et al., 2005). Per this view, lead-
ers are more effective in judgment and influence to
the extent that they are excellent representatives of,
and in tune with, the various understandings of
their firm or group. Having a network that reaches
into various corners of an organization is likely to
make a leader more prototypical, and so more com-
pelling and influential as a leader of that company.
More generally, senior contacts who spend time
with one or a few constituent groups in their firm
are likely to suffer from “silo” thinking and so be
unable to respond and behave in ways consistent
with the overall group. On the other hand, senior
contacts with nonredundant networks are much
more likely to comprehend and articulate the con-
stituent elements of their firm’s identity and cred-
ibly embody the firm’s interests. The practical im-
plication for senior organization members is that
their role and effectiveness may require them to
seek—and continue to develop—nonredundant
networks, reaching out to various constituent
groups in order to better understand both the na-
ture of resources and opportunities and the emerg-
ing identity of the organization.
Finally, another practical implication concerns
time management. More than people in most roles,
senior contacts rely on efficient networks. Subordi-
nates do better where leaders have smaller—but
also more diverse—networks. The implication is
that leaders need to be very selective in building
their networks, expanding their reach in such a
way that they limit the drain on their time. Network
efficiency matters a great deal to leaders presum-
ably because of the “deep” and “broad” require-
ments on their interpersonal time. They need to be
familiar with broad constituents, but they also need
to leave enough time for meaningful exchanges.
Future Research Directions and Limitations
This study suggests several avenues for future
research into positive network externalities. The
explosion of “360 degree” type measures in busi-
ness organizations today means that abundant data
on how actors contribute to one another should
now be available. The opportunities for scholarly
network studies should be considerably en-
hanced—no small outcome, given the difficulty of
collecting sensitive network data. Also, because
firms are increasing their focus on peer-to-peer con-
tributions, they should also be more open to schol-
arly studies of these measures. These surveys offer
opportunities for innovation as well, in the mea-
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sures of value-added, which academics can encour-
age HR practitioners to adapt. Another opportunity
to extend our arguments and findings is by exam-
ining other contingencies that make it beneficial to
connect to a broker. We looked at rank and the role
of authority-leadership, but Brass (2009) suggests
looking at other contingencies as well. For exam-
ple, closeness may be an important contingency,
impacting particularly the motivation for brokers to
do ego good and not harm. Future research should
also explore under what conditions connecting to a
broker is harmful. Because the potential for harm
seems so apparent, and detection often so poor,
studying the second-order effects of connecting to
brokers may offer good opportunities for examining
negative externalities, or the dark side of second-
order social capital.
Several limitations of our study need to be taken
into account and addressed in future research.
First, our data come from an investment bank. Al-
though we believe that such data capture well the
dynamics of fast-paced, knowledge-intensive organ-
izations, they may not capture as well the dynamics
of either more traditional or perhaps highly uncon-
ventional organizations. For example, in settings in
which knowledge and information are stickier and
culture inhibits sharing, second-order ties may
matter less (Burt, 2007). Second, in the studied
organization, the existence of multiple layers of
clearly delineated ranks allowed for a test of our
hypotheses, but not all organizations (especially
smaller ones) have such clear hierarchies in place.
Some organizations are much flatter. We believe
our arguments could be extended and adapted to
such organizations, but they cannot be transferred
indiscriminately to those settings that lack clearly
delineated ranks. Alternative ways to capture rank
would have to be found. Third, although the or-
thogonalization procedure we used allowed us to
more precisely test our arguments (allowing for
models with many variables and comprehensive
baselines), and it allowed valid statistical inference
about the direction and significance of the coeffi-
cients, interpretation of the size/magnitude of the
effects is not straightforward; effect magnitudes are
perhaps a widespread issue for the social sciences.
The relative correlations we obtained at least sug-
gest that our main effect (e.g., higher-ranked alter
density) is at least no smaller in size than the in-
fluence of age effects, average rating effects, and
rank effects. Finally, our data contain no measure
of interpersonal closeness between ego and alters/
brokers, a measure found to be consequential in
related studies (Bowler & Brass, 2006; Sparrowe &
Liden, 2005). As noted, future studies should ex-
amine the influence of such and other interper-
sonal constructs, in addition to the formal and in-
formal structural measures in this study.
Conclusions
Social capital brings many private benefits to an
individual, such as power, job attainment, career ad-
vancement, and innovativeness. We asked whether
this social capital—and specifically, brokerage social
capital—can also help this individual’s contacts, in
the sense of making them more able to add value to
others in the firm inwhich theywork. In other words,
we asked if second-order social capital matters. We
found that it does, providing that the contacts bearing
such capital occupy senior positions in the formal
structure of their firm. This finding suggests that bro-
kerage social capital can have positive externalities
affecting other actors in an organization. The net-
works of senior leaders can be consequential not only
for themselves (personal work) but also for the value-
adding work of their contacts. The effectiveness of
leaders and mentors may spring from not only per-
sonal qualities but also from position in their firm’s
informal structure.
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